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lieved the charge or not. Miller v. Johnson (1875) 79 Ill. 58; Rea v.
Harrington (1885) 58 Vt. 181. Chief Justice Shaw in speaking in Carter
v. Andrews (Mass. 1834) 16 Pick. 1, said, "It is no defense to this action
that the charge could not be true."
Evidence to show motive or malice of accused in making the statement
for which he is prosecuted is admissible. Russell v. State (1919) 169 N. C.
312, 84 S. E. 807. But under the narrow doctrine of some jurisdictions
evidence as to what the accused intended by the alleged libelous article was
held inadmissible under the rule that the meaning is to be gathered by de-
termining what men of ordinary understanding would infer therefrom.
People v. Strouch (1910) 247 Ill. 220, 93 N. E. 126. In a case arising in
Scotland a birth notice printed by a newspaper in good faith and in the
normal course of business was held actionable because of the extrinsic fact,
entirely unknown to the publishers, that the supposed parents had been
married less than a month. Morrison v. Ritchie (1902) 4 Scotch Sess.
Cases (5th ser.) 645. Morrison v. Smith (1903) 83 App. Div. 492, 82 N. Y.
S. 111; Switzer v. Anthony (1922) 71 Colo. 291, 206 Pac. 391; Farley v.
Evening Chronicle (1905) 113 Mo. A. 216, 87 S. W. 565. If the plaintiff
may show the applicability to him and their defamatory character as de-
termined by extrinsic facts, there is no reason why the defendant should not
be accorded the same right.
The rejection of the evidence offered by the accused in the principal case
presents an utter anomaly, and indicates that an unhealthy provincialism
dominated the Massachusetts court. It is hardly probable that the language
of the publication, in the light of the sorry history of the Sacco-Vanzetti af-
fair, was. calculated to induce those who read it to believe that the person
of whom it was written was guilty of a crime. It was plainly criticism and
abuse of the governor. E. S., '31.
INHITANC--EFFEcT OF LEGITImATING STATUTE.-An interesting case
which shows the way the law develops is In re Cross (1929) 197 N. C. 334,
148 So. 456, in which the claimant sought to share in the estate of his uncle.
It was admitted that he was born out of wedlock, but he claimed the benefit
of the statute legitimating bastards. "When the mother of a bastard child
and the reputed father of such child subsequently intermarry . . . the
child shall, in all respects after such intermarriage, be deemed legitimate
and entitled to all rights in the estate of its father and mother that it would
have had had it been born in lawful wedlock." N. C. Code (1927) sec. 279.
The court held that such a statute did not entitle the child to inherit from
ancestors beyond the father and mother. Inasmuch as the statue is in
derogation of the common law it should be strictly construed.
At common law a bastard was said to be filius nullius. He could not in-
herit from any one, and none could inherit from him except his direct
descendants, nor did subsequent marriage of his parents remove this dis-
ability. The law has nov been changed generally by statute. Kale's CASES
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ON PERSONS, 111; 1 Stimson, AMERICAN STATUTES, sec. 6631. Such a child
may be given legal status by subsequent acts of the parents. 3 R. C. L. 739.
Some statutes require public acknowledgment, some only marriage, while
the majority require both acknowledgment of paternity and intermarriage
to give rights of inheritance to an illegitimate.
In a few states the right of inheritance is expressly limited by statutes,
as illustrated in Hawkins v. Williams (1920) 146 La. 529, 83 So. 796, where
the court said that this policy was adopted not as a penalty on the unfortu-
nate child but to deter promiscuous relations and to support the institution
of marriage. This type of law does not render the child capable of inherit-
ing as a legal representative of the father or mother, but only legitimates it
as respects the parents. 3 R. C. L. 739. In a majority of states that do not
limit this right expressly, a legitimated child is considered to occupy the
status of one born in wedlock. Typical among these is New York, where
it is held that a subsequent marriage of the parents of an illegitimate child
enables it to inherit property as a natural child. Wissel v. Ott (1898) 34
App. Div. 159, 54 N. Y. S. 605. Later, in Hoagland's Estate (1925) 125
Misc. 376, 211 N. Y. S. 629, the law of New York was more clearly explain-
ed by the court as follows: "A law legitimizing a child born out of wedlock
whose parents subsequently marry should be liberally construed, and unless
there is positive legislation prohibiting the child from participating in the
benefits, its rights should be sustained." See N. Y. Code (1923) ch. 14, sec.
24.
In California a child born before wedlock becomes legitimated by subse-
quent marriage of its parents. Cal. Civ. Code (1923) sec. 215. And such
a child is legitimate for all purposes. Id. sec. 230. This statute enabled a
child to inherit from its grandmother. In Wolf v. Gall (1917) 32 Cal. App.
286, 163 Pac. 350, the court said, "We think it quite clear that the compliance
with the above statute makes a child born out of wedlock legitimate, that as
is stated in section 230 he is legitimate for all purposes, and that as a
legitimate child his rights of inheritance are governed by the section which
gives rights of inheritance to legitimate children." See also Miller v. Pen-
nington (1905) 218 Ill. 220, 75 N. E. 919; Kotzke v. Kotzke's Estate (1919)
205 Mich. 184, 171 N. E. 442; Copeland v. Copeland (1918) 73 Okla. 252,
175 Pac. 764.
The court in the principal case was probably influenced by an interpreta-
tion of a prior statute relating to the effect of legitimation by public ac-
knowledgment. N. C. Code (1927) sec. 278. This section of the statute
declares that by compliance with the prescribed process, a child born out of
wedlock may be allowed to inherit from his father only his real estate and
personal property in the same manner as if he had been born in wedlock.
Love v. Love (1910) 179 N. C. 115, 101 S. E. 562, interpreted this statute to
mean that the child after public acknowledgment could inherit only from his
father. It was treated in much the same manner as adoption statutes in
reference to inheritance, where it is generally agreed that while a man can
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create an heir for himself, he cannot by such act render the child capable of
inheriting from other than himself. In 'e Bradley's Estate (1925) 185
Wis. 393, 201 N. W. 923. But for that interpretation of the prior statute,
section 278 might permit the child legitimated by marriage to take as a
natural child.
The same difficulty was encountered in California where a prior statute
allowing legitimation by proclamation limited the right of inheritance to the
father's estate. The court avoided a conflict by saying that the later legis-
lation superseded, especially since the sections were not directly conflicting.
Wolf v. Gall, above. The court in the principal case might well have fol-
lowed the reasoning of that case, had it wished to place itself in line with
the holding of a majority of the states upon this question. H. V. C., '31.
INSURANcE--DEATH RESULTING FRom INTOXICATING DRINK AN Acci-
DENT.-Death of insured resulted from drinking wood alcohol in a beverage
which he supposed contained grain alcohol. Held, the death resulted from
bodily injuries directly and independently of all other causes through acci-
dental means within the terms of an accident policy, since the poisonous
content of the beverage was unforeseen, unexpected, and unusual. Zurich
General Accident and Liability Insurance Co. v. Flechinger (C. C. A. 4,
1929) 33 F. (2d) 853.
The oft-quoted rule laid down by Mr. Chief Justice Blatchford in a lead-
ing case is "that, if a result is such as follows from ordinary means, volun-
tarily employed, in a not unusual or unexpected way, it cannot be called a
result effected by accidental means; but if, in the act which precedes the
injury, something unforeseen, unexpected, or unusual occurs which pro-
duces the injury, then the injury has resulted through accidental means."1
United States Accident Association v. Barry (1889) 131 U. S. 100. A long
line of decisions has enunciated the principle that where the death or injury
is not the natural or probable result of the insured's voluntary act, or where
something unforeseen occurs in the doing of the act, the death Or injury is
held to be within the protection of policies insuring against death or injury
from accident or accidental means. Railway Co. v. Elliott (1893) 12 U. S.
381; Southwestern Commercial Travelers' Ass'n v. Smith (1898) 85 F. 401;
Schleicher v. General Accident F. & L. Assurance Corporation (1926) 240
Ill. App. 247; Lewis v. Ocean Accident & Guaranty Corporation (1918) 224
N. Y. 18, 120 N. E. 56; Young v. Railway Mail Ass'n (1907) 126 Mo. A. 325,
103 S. W. 557; Bule v. Travelers' Protective Ass'n (1911) 155 Mo. A. 629,
135 S. W. 497.
Another line of decisions holds that where an unusual or unexpected re-
sult occurs by reason of the doing by insured of an intentional act, where
there is no mischance, slip, or mishap in the doing of the act itself, the en-
suing injury or death is not caused through accidental means; that it must
appear that the means used were accidental, and it is not enough that the
result may be unexpected or unforeseen. Lehman v. Great Western Acci-
dent Ass'n (1911) 155 Iowa 737, 133 N. W. 752; Salinger v. Fidelity & Cas-
Washington University Open Scholarship
